Utblick nr 3 2017 out now!

Dreams and nightmares of politics is no new thing. Used as a rhetoric tool, as means of analysis and subject of comparison, utopias and dystopias has from time to time been an influential ingredient of public debate. Carrying hope and dreams of a better future, utopias also come with the risk of oppression – if the ends justify the means, hope might quickly turn into despair.

Utblick3_2017_fram2The third issue of Utblick 2017 examines these topics in greater detail. Covering subjects like (but not limited to) the state of contemporary politics, the role of social media, and the former colonial capital of Great Britain, we hope to provide some interesting reading for most of you. Pick up a copy of the magazine in a university campus or library nearby, or read it as PDF here.


Pleasant read,

Mikael and Axel

Utblick nr 2 2017 out now!

Utblick2_2017_framhelTime goes by and soon the spring semester will end. Dominated by the French elections, this spring has brought a lot of interesting matters of international policy. In this the second issue of Utblick 2017, we offer a mix of exciting topics, including but not limited to geopolitics in the Arctic, Islamic terrorism (and the practice of othering) and a few angles on capitalism. Read it online here – or pick up a copy of the magazine at Campus Haga or a library nearby, crash in a chair on a warm summer’s day and enjoy!

Pleasant read,


Mina and Axel

Utblick nr 1 2017 out now!

With a politically turbulent winter behind us, there has been no shortage of subjects to choose from when creating this first issue of Utblick 2017. Covering topics like the possible case of a Catalan state, the Dutch elections, automation in the global economy, and many more, we hope you will find some interesting reading in the International Machinery issue.

You can find tUtblick1_2017framsidaRätthe magazine in University of Gothenburg campuses, as well as in various libraries and cafés around town – and of course here on our website.


Pleasant read,

Mina and Axel, Editors-in-chief

New Issue of Utblick: (In)security

What is security? The field of Security Studies has various bids; some argue that it is a form of value that stands in proportion to an actor’s material well-being. Others claim that it is impossible to formulate a definition that satisfies every country, every culture, every people and every religion – in this view, security is a subjective concept defined by circumstances.

The matter is complicated even further when the topic is global security – different countries, cultures, peoples and religions have different ideas of what security is. While Americans may perceive US military presence in the Middle East as a reassurance of national security, the people living in that region may regard the very same thing as a cause of insecurity. In the same way, the individual goal of radicalization among Muslims may be to achieve individual social security. However, the result of that pursuit will inevitably endanger the security of others. Evidently, global security is an eternally multi-faced concept for which a single definition will never be enough.

The final issue of the year deals with some of the issues on the contemporary global security agenda, with the goal of providing a detailed and enlightening view of the problems facing our world today, and with the objective of shedding light upon conflicts that have ended up outside the public spotlight.

You can look for this issue of Utblick at coffee shops, libraries, museums, movie theatres and university faculties all across Göteborg, or read it online here.

The West Bank Barrier – Security or apartheid?

Written by Selma Aalachi

With a third of the world’s countries constructing barriers along their borders, the promise by Donald Trump to build a wall along the border between US and Mexico isn’t precisely a new idea. As a matter of fact, mankind has from early history to modern times built barriers with the aim to protect and demarcate. When the Berlin wall was demolished in the year of 1989, there were approximately 16 border fences around the world. Today, more than 40 states have built barriers against their neighbouring countries. Some of them are completed, while others are still under construction. One such example is the Israeli West Bank barrier.

As an attempt to prevent Palestinian terrorists from entering Israel, the Israeli government began constructing a barrier in 2002. The barrier divides the West Bank and is a network of concrete walls, fences and closed military roads. In some places, it is as high as 8 meters, making it twice as high as the Berlin Wall (the average height of the Berlin Wall was 3.6 meters). The West Bank barrier is also expected to reach at least 650 kilometers in length, making it not only twice as high as the Berlin Wall, but also four times as long. The Barrier will also be more than twice as long as the internationally recognised Green Line, which was supposed to outline the border between Israel and West Bank.

The Israeli government argues that the Barrier has a pivotal defensive purpose. They indicate that the number of Palestinian attacks have decidedly decreased on their soil since the beginning of its construction, as proof of its effectiveness. To emphasize its association with security, its proponents terms it the “Security-,” or “Anti-Terrorist Fence”. The term “fence” is ostensibly less correlated with dictatorial power, but rather with the belief that “good fences make good neighbours.”

On the other hand, for the opponents of the Barrier it is the “Separation-,” “Colonisation-,” or “Apartheid Wall,” as it infringes Palestinian territory, restricts freedom of movement and demolishes communities. The phrase ‘wall’ evokes negative connotations equated with dictatorial power and perpetual segregation. Additionally, because 85 per cent of the Barrier runs inside the West Bank, many consider it to be an impediment to the desire of establishing a viable state of their own. The international Court of Justice (ICJ) has stated that the wall should be dismantled, because it is constructed on occupied Palestinian territory. According to international law, no country has the right to act outside its sovereign territory. Therefore, in compliance with the fourth Geneva Convention, the Israeli West Bank barrier is illegal. Yet, the wall is expanding, just like the rest of the walls around the world.

Border walls and fences may not be a new phenomenon, but the rate at which they’re coming to being is assuredly anomalous; as it is the fastest rate since the Cold War. But Israel is not only separating themselves from the West Bank, it is also building a concrete wall along the Gaza Strip. The country is additionally planning to wall itself off from the surrounding Arab states, becoming a fortress-like nation. The Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has described the surrounding Arab states as ‘wild beasts’, which Israel needs to protect itself from. Moreover, let us not forget about the Egypt-Gaza barrier or the barbed-wire fence that India is constructing around Bangladesh. Turkey is building a concrete wall along its entire border with Syria. Hungary is planning to construct a second wall on its southern border with Serbia, while the Estonian government has approved the building of a fence along its border with Russia. Europe will shortly have a greater amount of border barriers than what it had during the Cold War.

The perception of boundaries performs a leading role in the conflict of nation building, territory and resources within Middle East. The reasoning behind this view is based on the concept of the nation-state, where every population should have their own territory and where no foreigners are allowed to intervene in their internal affairs. In the opinion of realism, the dominant school of thought in International Relations theory, states are central actors which operate in an anarchic system. Because states desire to guard their sovereignty, the primary motive is state survival. States will endeavour to gain power at the expense of their rivals. If Israel is to become more powerful, that necessarily means the loss of land for Palestine. This explains why the wall has shifted the borders. It can be argued that Israel is building the Barrier with the purpose of offering their people protection from the ravages of an insecure international system; especially being the only country in the world with a Jewish majority.

Nevertheless, there are those who argue that walls and border fences don’t work. Because terrorist groups, for example, have the resources to enter by safer methods, they are not affected by walls. They are able to shoot rockets over the fence or to dig tunnels under it. They also manage to trespass by using fake documents. West Bank Palestinians still manage to enter Israel on a daily basis in hopes of work, to harvest their fields, to visit their families or to attend prayers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

So if the West Bank barrier doesn’t stop terrorists or undocumented workers, nor outlines a substantial border – then what is it for?

Security theatre could be one explanation. The phrase refers to actions taken by the government with the purpose of making citizens feel safer by seeing something being dealt with; even though that action generates a negligible contribution to the general efforts of truly keeping the population safe. Security theatre provide the sense of security, not actual security. The state, by demonstrating sovereignty, simultaneously reifies authority over that territory and defines the limits of the people that are situated there. This differentiation stimulate more passionate feelings of belonging to the in-group, as well as the separation from the other on the outside. The creation of an ‘us’ can only exist by its separation of a ‘them’. By creating distinct territories, when dividing the two populations, it demonstrates what Israels is and what it is not.

Many argue that the Barrier’s real raison d’être is to create facts on the ground, or what is better known as expansionism. Without delving into the complicated, notwithstanding interesting, past, a vital fact is the close correlation in Israeli history between ideological goals and the advanced practical actions. When the Zionist movement began to promote Jewish resettlement of Palestine in the nineteenth century, the settlement policy had three primary goals: the establishment of conterminous sections of settlement, the purchase of rural land and the expansion of the territory that would help to delineate the future boundaries of the state.

Invariably, border fences and barriers are justified in the language of security. It has long been a toon in regulating, or attempting to regulate, human passage and defending territory by the construction of walls. But wasn’t this supposed to be a new era in global affairs? An era in which the national borders were softened because of international financial interdependence? Globalization was supposed to tear down barriers and bring people of different ethnicity together, not to create new walls.

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every human being has the right to life, freedom and legal security. The Berlin Wall became an emblem for state violence, oppression and denial of human rights. Even though the West Bank barrier has made it more difficult for terrorists to reach their target, and Palestinian attacks have almost entirely disappeared since the construction begun, correlation doesn’t necessarily equal causation. Even though a wall offers more security than no wall, they do little to address the roots of insecurity and migration. The West Bank barrier, in its current aggressive route, may severely harm the peace process and stimulate terrorism. It has destroyed Palestinian neighbourhoods, restrained the economy and illegally occupied land. So whether we choose to see the West Bank barrier as simply a security matter or as a symbolism of modern apartheid, the Barrier is sure to play a vital role in the complex process of territorial negotiation related to the Israel-Palestine conflict as a whole.

Joris Luyendijk: “Att stå utanför eurosamarbetet var kanske inte en bra idé för Sverige” (English and Swedish)

Written by: Ruben Dieleman (Swedish translation by Anna Lindvall)

Innan bankkrisen bröt ut år 2008 visste den nederländska journalisten och antropologen Joris Luyendijk “ingenting om finanssektorn, förutom att den var väldigt viktig”. Det som hände på börsmarknaden sköttes troligtvis av kvalificerade och kunniga ekonomer – så tänkte han då. Med krisen växte hans nyfikenhet och han bestämde sig för att spendera fem år med banktjänstemännen i London för att försöka begripa finansvärldens alla nyanser och nycker. Resultatet av hans forskning heter ”Simma med hajar”. Boken har blivit översatt till flera språk, sedan den publicerades år 2015. Luyendijk närvarade på Bokmässan i Göteborg för att tala om sin bok och delta i seminarier.

”Jag upptäcker ständigt luckor i min kunskap och försöker sedan utforska dem så mycket som möjligt” – Joris Luyendijk

Efter fem år förstod sig Luyendijk fortfarande inte helt på finansmarknaden. ”Sektorn är helt enkelt för stor för det. Den kräver ett språk som jag fortfarande inte helt kan behärska. När jag började min undersökning visste jag ungefär lika mycket om finanser som vilken människa som helst: ingenting. De flesta nyhetsläsare vill inte erkänna det, men de hoppar över ekonomidelen för att de inte förstår innehållet. Jag brukade också göra det. Mitt antagande att finanssektorn hanterades väl motbevisades under 2008. Konsekvenserna av det som hände då känner vi fortfarande av idag. Men det beteende och besluten som ledde fram till krisen har inte straffats än.”

Enligt Luyendijk borde banktjänstemännen bli kontrollerade på samma sätt som alla andra, på grund av riskerna de har tagit och skadan som de har orsakat världen. Hur de har kunnat komma undan med sina brott övergår hans förstånd. Hans annars lugna och diskreta röst brusar upp och trots att han är trött – ”jag sov knappt i natt” – blir han uppriktigt passionerad och arg när han pratar om misskötseln han upptäckte i London. ”Moralen måste återvända till börsmarknaden.” Luyendijk har inte sett någon förändring sedan kraschen. “Åtgärderna som togs efter krisen var bra, men långt ifrån tillräckliga”.

Nyligen skrev Luyendijk om Brexits potentiella effekter på Europa och på Nederländerna i synnerhet. Han följde utvecklingen med en viss skadeglädje: “Britterna kommer behöva skriva om hundratals lagar de kommande 20 åren. De kommer behöva omdefiniera sin roll i Europa nu, det var det som folket ville. Det kommer bli en smärtsam, svår process för dem. Men det öppnar också upp andra möjligheter, åtminstone för resten av EU. Britterna har alltid varit översittare i Europeiska Unionen. De har blockerat viktiga policybeslut och reformer, de har dessutom alltid drivits av sina egenintressen utan någon större hänsyn till kontinenten. Jag kan bara gratulera att de på eget bevåg går ur unionen nu. För de länder som faktiskt behöver unionen och som har integrerat sig med sina grannländer under flera årtionden, kan detta vara en fördel.”

Samma gäller för Sverige, enligt den bästsäljande nederländska författaren. Men det finns en avigsida. “Sverige har valt att inte sitta vid bordet där alla beslut tas. De har fortfarande sin egen valuta. Att stå utanför eurosamarbetet var kanske inte en bra idé för Sverige. För Nederländerna är det annorlunda. Alltid varit annorlunda, faktiskt. Den holländska valutan var bunden till den tyska D-marken i över ett decennium. För närvarande delar Nederländerna armén, flottan, lagar, förordningar och stora delar av sin ekonomi med Belgien och Tyskland. Från detta perspektiv är risken för en Nexit liten.”

Samtidigt sköljer anti-EU-känslor över kontinenten, av exakt den sorten som gjorde Brexit möjligt och som känns av i både Nederländerna och Sverige. Framtidstron på EU har minskat kraftigt sedan Lissabonfördraget trädde i kraft.  Hur otroligt det än verkar, ska risken för att ännu ett land träder ur EU inte underskattas. Luyendijk kommenterar: ”Så som unionen fungerar just nu är definitivt problematiskt. Om Europas regeringar inte lyckas råda bot på den misskötsel inom EU och missnöje som människor med all rätt känner gentemot unionen, om förändring och rättvisa endast kan uppnås genom att lämna samarbetet, då skulle jag också föredra en sådan utväg. Men jag är inte övertygad om detta än.”

Den oro som märks av i Luyendijks kommentarer ger intrycket av att en apokalyptisk situation är nära. Hur påverkar det författaren själv? ”När jag var korrespondent i Mellanöstern fick jag uppleva många skrämmande situationer. I London kände jag en annan slags skrämmande kyla. Men hoppet, ja, det dör sist”, säger han leende.


Joris Luyendijk: “Opting out of the Euro may not have been such a great idea for Sweden”

Before the 2008 banking crisis, Dutch journalist and anthropologist Joris Luyendijk “knew nothing of the financial sector, other than that it was very important”. Whatever happened on the stock market trade floors was probably done by qualified people, or so he thought. When the crisis hit, his curiosity sparked, and he set out to spend 5 years in the City of London among bankers, to try and grasp the world of finance. The product of his research is called ‘Swimming with sharks’, which came out in 2015 and has been printed in several languages. Luyendijk was present on Göteborgs Bokmässa to talk about his book and to provide seminars on various topics.

“I discover holes in my knowledge and subsequently try to find out as much as possible about them.” – Joris Luyendijk

After 5 years, the Dutchman still does not fully understand finance. “The sector is just too big for that. It requires learning a language that I still have not fully mastered. When I started my investigation, I knew as much about it as the average person: nothing. Most newspaper-reading people will not admit it, but they skip the financial segment of the paper because they do not understand. I used to do that as well. My assumption that the financial sector was well taken care of proved wrong in 2008. The consequences of what happened then are still felt today. But the conduct that lies at the foundation of the crisis is yet to be punished properly.”

According to Luyendijk, bankers will have to be disciplined in the same way as anybody else, for the risks that they have taken and the damage they have done to the world. Why bankers keep on getting away with their crimes is beyond him. His voice, calm and low by default, sweeps up, and even though he is tired – “I hardly slept last night” – he becomes genuinely passionate and visibly angry when talking about the malpractices he saw in The City. “Morality has to return to the stock exchange.” Luyendijk has not seen much change since the crash. “The measures that have been taken are good, but far from sufficient.”

Recently, Luyendijk wrote about the impacts the Brexit might have on Europe and the Netherlands in particular. He followed the developments with a certain kind of schadenfreude: “The British will have to rewrite countless laws of the course of the next 20 years. Essentially, they will have to reinvent themselves because the people willed it. That will be a painful, difficult process for them. But it opens up some opportunities, for the rest of the EU at least: The Brits have always been the bullies of the European Union. They have blocked crucial policies and reforms, and they have always pursued their own interest without any consideration for the continent. I can only applaud that they step out of the union by themselves now. For countries that need the union and that have de facto been weaved into their neighbouring countries for decades, it can be beneficial.”

The same goes for Sweden, according to the bestselling Dutch author. But there is a downside. “Sweden has chosen not to sit at the table where all the decisions are made. They still have their own currency. Opting out of the Euro may not have been such a great idea for Sweden. For the Netherlands, where I come from, this is different. Always been actually. The guilder was bound to the Deutsche Mark for more than a century. Currently, the Netherlands shares its army and navy, laws, permits and economy with Belgium and Germany. From this point of view, the likelihood of a Nexit seems small.”

Meanwhile, however, an anti-EU sentiment is sweeping the continent. Exactly the kind that made the Brexit possible, and is looming over both the Netherlands and Sweden. The belief in a future for the union has decreased significantly since the inception of the Treaty of Lisbon. As insensible an idea it may seem, the chance of another exit should not be underestimated. Luyendijk agrees: “The way the union currently function is absolutely problematic. And if the governmental bodies fail to react to the legitimate discontent and mismanagements within the union, if change and justice can only be reached by ways of a departure, then I myself would prefer an exit, too. I am still not convinced of this, however.”

The urgency that Luyendijk puts in his words and work, gives one the impression that apocalyptic scenarios are at hand. How does it affect the author himself? “When I was stationed in the Middle East as a correspondent, I saw many daunting scenes. In London, I experienced another kind of disheartening prospect. But hope, well, hope dies last”, he smirks.


What’s wrong with our polls?

Up until the last moment, most polls failed to foresee Donald Trump winning the American presidential election. In recent days, polls have also been wrong in predicting the support for right-wing populist parties, Brexit and the Colombian peace deal. Some would say that there’s always a chance of being wrong; polling deals with probabilities, which in themselves are not certain, as anyone who has played any game involving a dice would know (right, Settlers lovers?). But what can explain the recent inaccuracies in major elections and referendums? I argue that the problem lies is our assumption that the past can predict the future.

A poll is an activity in which people are asked questions in order to get information about what they think about something. So, when conducting polls, one might ask “who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election?” and get the reply “Hillary Clinton”. After asking a certain amount of people, we generally assume that we have an accurate picture of what the results would look like if everyone voted. If we could ask everyone in the U.S. (and get them to answer truthfully) there would be little risk of inaccuracy (and no need for an election). But this is neither possible nor necessary. By using the right tools, we can usually get an accurate picture of the entire population by asking a few. The objective is to get as reliable a result as possible with as little effort as possible.

One way to do this is to randomly pick people out of a phone book and call them up to ask whatever it is we want to know. The method may sound erratic but is in fact fairly reliable. The probability of getting systematic errors in the collected answers is quite small, assuming that everyone answers. But people increasingly don’t. Many young people don’t own landlines and don’t reply when an unknown number calls their cell phone, while old people tend to have landlines and answer them. This means that different groups will be over or under represented in the responses, ultimately giving an inaccurate picture.

Another difficulty is getting people to stay on the line and answer the questions sincerely. The difference between polls and the actual outcome on election day has been dubbed the “Brexit effect”, however, similar effects such as ‘The Shy Tory Factor’ and ‘The Bradley Effect’ have been known for some time. People tend to lie in polling situations if they feel cornered or feel that their self-image is threatened. As a result, there can be systematic errors in the responses, as it becomes uncertain who’s lying and who’s telling the truth.

Another method, often used together with the one described above, is to create quotas and try to fill them. If you, for example, know that 50% of the population are women, 30% are Hispanic and 15% are unemployed, this should be reflected in your quotas. So out of the people who answered your poll, you would have to check how many were from each “quota” and adjust the results accordingly. Therefore, if only 5% of those who answered your poll were Hispanic, you would enlarge the sample and make their views represent the views of all Hispanics in the general population. The problem here is obviously that those 5% might very well not represent the views of the other 25%, creating an inaccurate depiction. This has been reported to have happened in some polls prior to the U.S. election.

But even if you manage to get everyone you call to answer, and do so truthfully, and if you correct any mishaps by “weighing” certain groups (filling out the quotas), how do you know who is actually going to turn out on election day and vote? Come election day, will the people that answered your poll find themselves in the voting booth, and will they vote in the same way that they stated they would in the poll? Like with the quotas, this can be accounted for to a certain extent by looking at people’s voting tendencies in the past. Less educated and affluent people tend to vote to a lesser extent in most countries, and women are slightly more likely to vote than men. By adjusting the people who answered the poll to the expected participation in different groups, we assume that we can get a relatively clear picture of what’s going to happen on election day.

The bottom line is that we assume that things will progress in the same way they have in the past, that some trends will persist long into the future. We assume that social groups will vote similarly and that individuals in these groups therefore can be weighted to represent each other. We assume that the groups that didn’t vote last time will not do so this time either, and that they therefore can be removed from the equation.

But it is possible that the current state of affairs is different from that of the past, and that the future therefore cannot be predicted by relying on old data. While it is tempting to see events such as right-wing populism as a fad (“their support will disappear when the economy picks up”) and Brexit as an accident (“some didn’t understand that it was the actual referendum they voted in”) the reality is that many of us seem to stand at an ambiguous crossroad between the old and the new. If this is true, and Trump, Brexit and right-wing populism today represent something “new” when it comes to political behaviour (even if the message is old), then the methods we’ve used so far risk becoming inadequate in predicting what’s next.

Intervju med Alice Teodorescu

I juni månad beslutade det brittiska folket att Storbritannien kommer att lämna den Europeiska Unionen (EU). I folkomröstningens efterdyningar har det spekulerats flitigt kring vilka konsekvenser skilsmässan kan komma att få, och hur dessa konsekvenser kommer att påverka unionens framtid. Hur som helst är Brexit inte EUs enda orosmoment – president Erdogans och president Putins allt närmare relation, auktoritära medlemsländer som inte följer stadgarna, exploatering av den fria rörligheten och ett växande missnöje, särskilt i Västeuropa, är andra orsaker till varför institutionens framtid är osäker. Utblick har samtalat med Alice Teodorescu, politisk redaktör på Göteborgsposten, för att få en klarare bild av det känsliga läget i Europa.

Den 23 juni röstade Storbritannien för att lämna den Europeiska unionen, hur ser du på det beslutet?
– Jag är inte förvånad. Både i Storbritannien, och i övriga EU, har ett missnöje växt fram gällande hur samarbetets utveckling har sett ut. Det är förstås tråkigt, med tanke på hur framgångsrik unionen har varit som fredsprojekt. Men jag tror att EU har expanderat med fel fokus. Man har detaljstyrt mycket, samtidigt som man har misslyckats med hanteringen av de stora frågorna, exempelvis migration.

Storbritanniens nya premiärminister, Theresa May, valde Brexit-förespråkaren Boris Johnson som utrikesminister. Varför?
– Jag tror att det handlar om trovärdighet. Theresa May blev premiärminister, trots att hon var emot Brexit. Boris Johnson var en av huvudfigurerna i lämna-rörelsen. Han åtnjuter stort förtroende bland medborgare som röstade för att lämna unionen, och av den anledningen är det ett naturligt val. Det är också viktigt att poängtera att katastrofen som målades upp i samband med folkomröstningen, (ännu) inte har inträffat.

EUs förhandlingsposition är förstås väldigt känslig, eftersom ett gynnsamt avtal för Storbritannien kan få övriga EU-länder att vilja omförhandla sina respektive avtal. Med vilken attityd borde EU förhandla, tycker du?
– Storbritannien har varit tydligt med att man vill lämna samarbetet, och det måste man stå för. EU bör gå in i förhandlingarna med en tuff attityd, men det handlar inte bara om Brexit. Det är en större fråga, som i grund och botten handlar om att EU inte lever upp till förväntningarna i de frågor som medlemsländerna bedömer vara viktigast. Brexit är förstås en kris, men också en möjlighet i och med att de brister som idag finns i systemet uppmärksammas.

Ungern och Polen, med flera, verkar driva alltmer åt ett auktoritärt styre, och har dessutom inte tagit sitt ansvar i flyktingkrisen. Relationen mellan sådana regeringsformer och EUs grundläggande principer är knepig. Vad har EU för alternativ, bör man utesluta länder som inte tar ansvar?
– Det här är demokratins dilemma. Både regeringen i Ungern och regeringen i Polen är demokratisk valda, och det kommer alltid finnas länder som är missnöjda med andra befolkningars demokratiska beslut. Man kan uttrycka kritik, men jag anser inte att man bör utesluta vissa stater, utan istället att man bör skrota länders egna asylsystem, och ersätta dem med ett kvotsystem där EU fördelar ansvar mellan länderna. Härifrån blir det förstås en fråga om suveränitet, men faktum är att dagens system inte fungerar. EU är ett samarbete, och ett samarbete har för- och nackdelar. Det fungerar inte om medlemsländer väljer vilka ansvar de vill ta och inte ta. Vissa medlemsländer är generösa, andra inte, och det finns en oförmåga till koordination. Länderna är inte överens om EUs kärnuppdrag, och det är där man måste börja.

Turkiet har, de senaste åren, varit aktuellt för EU-medlemskap. I dagsläget går knappast att hävda att Turkiet är en demokrati. Kan du berätta lite om den här situationen?
– Erdogan har använt sig av hot för att försöka tvinga EU att inkludera Turkiet, vilket inte är acceptabelt. Men han har också varit smart. Han har använt flyktingkrisen som utpressning, vilket har försatt Europa i en situation som är svår att hantera. EU har hamnat i ett spel som inte går att vinna, och Erdogan sitter på ett trumfkort som vi gett honom genom att inte agera tidigare. Turkiet kommer fortsätta närma sig Ryssland om unionen fortsätter hålla dem utanför samarbetet. EU betalar för sina misstag.

Flera länder utnyttjar fördelarna med att vara med i EU, utan att ta det ansvar som medlemskap innebär. Anser du att EU borde anta en hårdare förhandlingsattityd?
– Nej, det skulle få negativa konsekvenser. Om beslut upplevs komma ovanifrån lär det göra opinionen mer kritisk. Det är viktigt att komma överens om vilka områden som tillhör EU. Självklart är det en pedagogiskt svår uppgift, men det är det enda sättet att enas. Medlemsländer måste känna ansvar, men de måste också känna att deras invändningar tas på allvar.

Vilka brister/fördelar ser du med EU i allmänhet?
– EU har varit, och är fortfarande, ett väldigt framgångsrikt fredsprojekt som har gynnat, och fortsätter gynna Europa. Dessutom är det viktigt att betona den ekonomiska faktorn; fri rörlighet av både människor och varor har spelat en otroligt viktig roll i Europas tillväxt. EU tillför mycket av godo, och det vore förödande om samarbetet luckrades upp. Men det behöver reformeras. Det kan inte fortsätta vara en elitklubb som utvidgar det glapp som redan finns mellan etablissemanget och människan på gatan. Detta är en farlig utveckling, eftersom den leder till att genomsnittsmedborgarens förtroende för systemet undermineras. Det är viktigt att komma ihåg att EU faktiskt inte är mer än medlemsländerna. Man behöver tänka om, man måste prata, stater emellan. Det är svårt, men absolut nödvändigt. Europa befinner sig i en existentiell identitetskris som skadar ett samarbete som har tjänat kontinenten väldigt väl under lång tid.

Läs hela numret här.

New Issue of Utblick: Exit

In the aftermath of Great Britain’s surprising decision to leave the European Union, there has been no shortage of speculations about the consequences that such a departure will have. Emerging Euro-sceptical forces throughout Europe have unanimously approved of the result of the referendum, and have attempted to reinforce anti-EU sentiment in their respective countries, calling for their own referenda. It remains unclear, however, if Brexit will ignite a trend that leads to the demise of the union, or if it instead marks the turn of that very same trend.

Peoples and governments receding to the nation state is by no means exclusive for the European continent. It’s happening in every part of the world, and even if the different movements distinguish significantly from one another, there is at least one reoccurring critique – the denunciation of globalization. On the other side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and even Hillary Clinton, have all taken a critical stance against both the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade- and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In South America, market liberalization has been said to lead to exploitation of the continent’s underdevelopment, effectively cementing many countries in their current, underdeveloped state. In Asia, China has benefited greatly, and is currently breathing down the US’ neck as the world’s only superpower. And in the Middle East, Turkey is picking the raisins out of the globalization cake, utilizing the global market while attempting to steer clear of cultural change. Everything in the middle of the worst refugee crisis in decades, and an existential environmental crisis that requires intergovernmental cooperation more than anything.

This issue of Utblick offers discussions on the future of the European Union, in depth analyses on specific countries, and debates, both on the origin and progression of different forms of criticism against globalization, and on the character and effects of the process itself.

We wish you a pleasant read!

You can look for this issue of Utblick at coffee shops, libraries, museums, movie theatres and university faculties all across Göteborg, or read it online here.

The enigma of a black beard in the West

This text could simply begin by nagging upon all the strange looks and comments one with long black beard might receive in the West. In fact, it even does not need to be long. Although this has been partly a lived experience of mine over the past six months that I’ve grown my beard, I decided to do the exact opposite.

In the next few lines, I try to list some of the possible motivations behind growing a beard which might trigger us to pause for a while, next time we encounter a bearded man and buy some time before rushing into any hasty judgment; a moment of wonder. Here I am discussing Black beards since, to my experience, beards of other colors are not subject of such an ambiguity in the West.
Black Beard as:

– A trendy fashion
Growing a beard might be a trendy fashion. Well, let me rephrase that: growing a beard, of any color, might be a trendy fashion; as simple as that.

– An ebullition
Emotional outbursts might come in different forms. Growing a beard might be sign of an emotional outburst; an ebullition. In a societal context, minorities of different sorts might experience several ebullition periods due to their submissive position vis-à-vis dominant position of the majority. Such an experience may occur in very ordinary contexts, and herein you might bear the feeling more frequently if you are easy to spot. Let’s take a Middle-Eastern with black hair in a mix of white Swedes. This would put the person on display and potentially more subjected to the submissive status. Appearance has an identity touch. The way we look is deeply intertwined with our inner identity. Growing a beard might be a way to surface this feeling, a way to oppose the unreceptive ambience, a way to not dilute the basal identity elements i.e. appearance: “Yes, this is me. I am different.”

– A religious identity-element
Some followers of many religions grow beard, namely Jews, Christians, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims. This practice might be underpinned by different reasons e.g. sign of a pious living, endorsed by a Prophet, etc. At the end of the day, growing a beard might count as an identity element for some followers, especially if they reside outside their society of origin. Therefore, growing a beard might become a practice to emphasize their identity. Humans languish without identity.

– A flag of fanaticism?
There exist fanatic figures that have beard. However neither all bearded men are fanatics nor are all fanatics bearded. Indeed, fanatics come in all sorts of color, shape and race. The term fanatic might easily be attributed to a thought or behavior but it is difficult to depict a fanatic appearance. However, black beard as a flag of fanaticism is perhaps the perception many in the West have; a perception full of prejudices lurked beneath the surface and rarely challenged. A perception which West-centric media, among several contributing factors, has perhaps played a role in shaping through selective projection of others.